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I. Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission. Claimant asserts the
Commission's finding that he failed to prove he was entitled to compensation for a psychological
injury as a result of his November 13, 2005, industrial accident and injury pursuant to Idaho
Code § 72-451 is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Course of Proceedings

Claimant filed a Complaint against Employer/Surety on February 21, 2008. CR., pp. 1-2).
The matter was tried before a referee on December 9, 2010. CR., p. 6). The sole issue for
determination was whether and to what extent Claimant's November 13, 2005, injury includes a
psychological condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-451. CR., pp. 6-7). On July 19, 2011, the
referee issued written proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. CR., p. 41). The referee
found that Claimant failed to prove he was entitled to compensation for a psychological injury as
a result of his November 13, 2005, industrial accident and injury pursuant to Idaho Code § 72451. CR., p. 40). Given the numerous inconsistencies in Claimant's subjective reports contained
in his medical records, she concluded he was not a reliable historian with respect to his medical
history. CR., p. 9). She also found the opinions of Claimant's experts less persuasive than the
opinion of Employer's/Surety's expert because, inter alia, they lacked foundation in that they did
not review his pre-injury medical records and relied exclusively on Claimant's subjective
statements about his prior psychological treatment.

CR., pp. 28-40).

The referee found

Employer' s/Surety' s expert opinion more credible because he was the only expert who tested
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Claimant to determine whether he qualified for a clinical diagnosis of PTSD, and was the only
expert who reviewed records regarding Claimant's industrial injury and pre-injury psychiatric
condition. (R., pp. 35-40).
The Commissioners reviewed the record and the referee's recommendations, and issued
an order approving, confirming, and adopting her findings of fact and conclusions of law as that
of the Commission on August 5, 2011. (R., pp. 42-43). Claimant timely filed a request for
rehearing on August 24, 2011, which the Commission denied on September 16, 2011, on the
ground it failed to state an argument on which the Commission could revise its conclusions. (R.,
pp. 44-45, 49-51). The Commission further stated that although Claimant disagreed with its
conclusion, the decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. (R.,
p.51). On September 27,2011, Claimant filed a request for reconsideration of the order denying
request for rehearing. (R., pp. 54-55). On October 26,2011, prior to the Commission issuing an
order on the matter, Claimant filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., p. 90). Because the notice moved
the case into the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Commission issued an order on
November 1,2011, declining to rule on Claimant's request for reconsideration. (R., pp. 90-91).

II. Statement of Facts
Industrial Injury and Treatment
On November 13, 2005, Claimant suffered a burn injury while working as a manager
when he tripped in the kitchen and his right forearm went into a deep fryer. (R., p. 9). He
initially presented to the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center emergency room, and then
transferred to the University of Utah Hospital (UUH) in Salt Lake City for further treatment.
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(R., pp. 14-15). Claimant stayed at UUH for four days, and received both medical care and
counseling.

(R., p. 15).

During that time, he was noted to have shown exaggerated pain

behaviors and an exaggerated impression of his injury, as well as other mental issues. (R., p.
15). At no time did he undergo skin grafts, as he reported to subsequent providers. (Def. Ex.
18). Following discharge from UUH, Claimant stayed at a nearby hotel for another ten days in
order to receive follow-up care. (R., p. 15).
Claimant's condition improved and he returned to Idaho where he treated several times
with R. Timothy Thurman, M.D., but failed to follow-through with his recommended physical
therapy.

(R., p. 17; Def. Ex. 22, p. 355).

He returned to work for Employer as a kitchen

manager five months after his accident, and was released from Dr. Thurman's care on May 17,
2006. (R., p. 17; Cl. Depo., p. 68, L. 15-22; Def. Ex. 19, p. 335). Dr. Thurman gave Claimant a
3% whole person impairment rating (l % for skin disfigurement and 2% for nerve disturbance)
without permanent work restrictions. (Def. Ex. 19, p. 335). Shortly thereafter, Claimant moved
to Massachusetts and continued to work for Employer as a manager. (Cl. Depo., pp. 83, L. 1019, 84, L. 21-24). He told his medical providers at the time that he transferred for a promotion,
but stated during litigation he wanted a change of environment to "ease his extreme feelings and
intrusive thoughts." (Tr., p. 45; Cl. Depo., p.69, L. 8-10; Cl. Post-Hearing Brief, p. 4; Def. Ex.
24, p. 369). While in Massachusetts, his son was born with a cleft palate condition, resulting in a
number of doctor visits and surgeries. (R., p. 10). Claimant changed jobs and worked at a sea
food restaurant before returning to Idaho to work at Ruby River Steakhouse. (Tr., pp. 46-47).
Claimant testified at hearing that he left that job and two subsequent jobs because of his inability
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to trust his coworkers. (R., p. 10; Tr., pp. 49-50, 58-59). At his deposition, however, Claimant
testified that he left Ruby River because he disagreed with the way it was operated, and left a job
at Cartridge World because his manager was "a prick." (Mazzone Depo., pp. 91, 97, L. 20-25).
In October 2007, Claimant presented to the Department of Health and Welfare Regional
Behavioral Health Services (Behavioral Health) for what he described as PTSD symptoms as a
result of his 2005 burn injury. (R., p. 21; Def. Ex. 30, p. 412). He reported nightmares, crying
spells, anxiety, flashbacks, intrusive memories, sleep problems, depression, and hypersensitivity.
(R., p. 21; Def. Ex. 30, p. 412-13). He also reported only one other major depressive episode,
which was after the death of his daughter five years prior, when he was hospitalized for one
week and prescribed antidepressants. (R., p. 21; Def. Ex. 30, p. 412). With respect to his burn
injury, Claimant inaccurately told providers he had skin grafts and was in the hospital for
"several months." (Def. Ex. 30, pp. 412, 420, 430-440).
Claimant received prescription medications and counseling at Behavioral Health several
more times in October. (Def. Ex., 30 pp. 420-27). His visits then became monthly, with some
periods of no treatment, through January 2009. (Def. Ex. 30, pp. 428-449). Chad Murdock,
M.D., was responsible for managing Claimant's symptoms with medications. (Murdock Depo.,
p. 6, L. 11-12). At his deposition, Dr. Murdock testified that his knowledge of Claimant's
psychological history came exclusively from what Claimant told him and the initial intake report
prepared by a social worker. (Murdock Depo., p. 7, L. 18-25). Dr. Murdock did not review any
of Claimant prior medical records, including those from three days before his burn injury
describing significant psychological stressors and symptoms. (R., pp. 28-29; Def. Ex. 30, pp.
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275-76; Murdock Depo., p. 7, L. 18-25). Though he documented Claimant's nightmares, he did
not record their subject matter.

(Murdock Depo., p. 16, L. 2-6).

Dr. Murdock diagnosed

Claimant with PTSD, severe major depression, and possible dissociative disorder. (Murdock
Depo., p. 10, L. 6-11). He testified that the predominant, primary cause of Claimant's PTSD was
his industrial accident and treatment. (Murdock Depo., pp. 20, L. 15-16, 23).
In May 2008, Claimant received in-patient treatment from Mary Beth Ostrom, M.D., at
the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center Behavioral Health Center. (Ostrom Depo., p. 5, L.
13-20). Dr. Ostrom testified that she treated Claimant again in 2010 when he received inpatient
care, and several times after that as an outpatient. (Ostrom Depo., pp. 5, L. 13-20, 8 L. 4-5, 1820). Records of Dr. Ostrom's treatment are not in the record. (R., p. 33). Dr. Ostrom testified
that she only saw "some" of Claimant's records from Region VII Mental Health Center and
outpatient treatment with Dr. Murdock. (Ostrom Depo., p. 9, L. 5-6). Similar to Dr. Murdock,
she did not review or have independent knowledge of Claimant's earlier psychological treatment,
including treatment he received immediately prior to the 2005 accident.

(R., p. 34; Ostrom

Depo., p. 9, L. 9-14). Based on Claimant's reported history, Dr. Ostrom opined he has chronic
PTSD as a result of his 2005 burn injury and bipolar disorder type I. (Dr. Ostrom Depo., pp. 10,
L. 19-21, 12, L. 16-19; Cl. Ex. H, p. 250). She explained, however, that she could not state with
certainty whether his burn accident and injury are the predominant cause of his PTSD given his
multiple other psychiatric issues. (R., p. 34; Dr. Ostrom Depo., p. 22, L. 13-20).
In February 2008 and July 2009 (and very briefly in May 2009), Michael Enright, Ph.D.,
evaluated Claimant at Employer's/Surety's request and performed a number of psychological
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tests. (Def. Ex. 32). Dr. Enright testified that his knowledge of Claimant's history came from
Claimant himself, through personal interviews and reading the hearing transcript in this matter,
and a "voluminous amount" of psychiatric and general medical records, including records before
and after Claimant's 2005 bum accident.

(R., p.36; Def. Ex. 32, pp. 455-57, 470, 475-76;

Enright Depo., pp. 7, L. 13-25, 8, L 1-7).

Dr. Enright also testified about the American

Psychiatric Association's diagnostic and statistics manual and its criteria for establishing PTSD.
(Enright Depo., pp. 11-17, 26-29). He also discussed the various types of medications Claimant
took prior to and at the time of his industrial accident, and the conditions/symptoms they treat,
including bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and sleep disturbances. (Enright Depo., pp. 57,
L. 15-16, 62-65, 68, 73, 74, 140, L. 10-16). During one of his examinations of Claimant, Dr.

Enright administered the Clinical Administered PTSD Scale and determined Claimant does not
meet the criteria for a clinical diagnosis of PTSD, has somatization tendencies, multiple life
stressors, a longstanding psychiatric disorder, and unmet dependency needs that account for the
symptoms he (Claimant) attributes to his industrial injury. (R., pp. 35-36; Enright Depo., pp. 56,
L. 3-7, 58, L. 2-8; Def. Ex. 32, pp. 464-68). Dr. Enright's reports document multiple examples
of Claimant's inconsistent reports of his medical and psychiatric history. (R., p.36; Def. Ex. 32,
pp. 452-68; Enright Depo., pp. 54-60).
Pre-Injury Psychiatric and Medical Treatment
Prior to Claimant's 2005 industrial accident, he received treatment for debilitating
anxiety, PTSD, bipolar disorder, depression, sleep disturbances, extreme mood fluctuations, trust
issues, and various other psychological problems. (R., pp. 9, 11-14). Just three days before his
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2005 industrial injury, Claimant underwent a psychiatric evaluation and reported severe manic
symptoms, including sleep deprivation for two weeks, difficulty concentrating, and feelings of
being overwhelmed.

(R., pp. 8-9).

Relevant psychiatric and medical history includes the

following:

1994/1995 (age 18 or 19) - Admitted as an inpatient for psychiatric treatment
following a break up. (Def. Ex. 7, p. 184).
-

9126/2002 (Phoenix, AZ, age 26) - Admitted for four days to Thunderbird
Medical Center's Adult Behavioral Health Unit for depressive disorder.
Admission notes state: "26 y.o. male admitted to unit due to self-reports of
increasing depression, anxiety, that pt describes as debilitating enough to affect
his ability to function .... Reports poor sleep, poor appetite, labile mood." (Def.
Ex. 7, pp. 173-77). Current medications included Zyprexa, Restoril, Zoloft, and
Topomax. Claimant reported that he smoked marijuana ten days prior to
admission and that his longest period of sobriety was two years (between ages 18
and 20). (Def. Ex. 7, p. 180). On a scale of one to ten, Claimant rated his anxiety
and depression a ten. (Def. Ex. 7, p. 188).

Notes from a therapy session state Claimant "expressed depression
surrounding his work environment and frustrations at being a supervisor,
boss/wanting to be liked . ... " (Def. Ex. 7, p. 190) (emphasis added). Upon
discharge, his physician identified the following problems to be treated: "Mood
disturbances as evidenced by increasing feelings of helplessness/hopelessness,
difficulty concentrating, increased sadness, increased anxiety, and distorted
thinking." (Def. Ex. 7, p. 197) (emphasis added).
-

1/11/2003 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 26) - Records from Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center state: "The patient has a history of bipolar disorder and post
traumatic stress disorder. He has recently moved to the area within the last five
days. Interestingly, he has been on three different psychotropic medications
in recent months, Zyprexa, Zoloft, and Gabitril. He ran out of those medications
five days ago." (Def. Ex. 6, p. 107) (emphasis added).

-

6/23/2003 (Twin Falls, ID, age 26) - Emergency room visit for a headache lasting
four days. Reported associated nausea, vomiting, and neck pain. Records list
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tension headaches and bipolar affective disorder under "Past Medical History."
(Def. Ex. 9, pp. 203-205) (emphasis added).
-

2117/2004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Records from Dr. Caitlin Ahem state:
"MOOD Swings was seen and treated [by a] psychiatrist in the past and did well
on Zyprexa and Zoloft. He went off because he did not have ins[ urance] and
would like to go back on. SLEEP Disturbance occ[ asionally] will not sleep or
eat for days." Dr. Ahem diagnosed Claimant with manic depression. (Def. Ex.
12, p. 224) (emphasis added).

-

4/23/2004 (Cheyenne, WY, age 27) - Records from HealthReach Acute Care
state: "Comes in today, difficulties with his bipolar. He has been on Zyprexa and
Zoloft. That has worked well for him for a couple of years now. He has not had
any manic episodes however the past five days he has been having difficulties."
Diagnosis: Bipolar with insomnia. Hand-written notes state that Ambien has
not helped in the past; Claimant just needs to sleep; two years ago today his
daughter died; his five-year-old son had palate surgery, and; he was currently off
work. (Def. Ex. 10, p. 219) (emphasis added).

-

4/26/2004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Records from Dr. Harris Jensen state:
"Patient with a history of bipolar disorder presents with complaints of more
mania [and) depression symptoms breaking through such that he hasn't been
able to work for several days. Daughter died 5/3102 - Matthew [diagnosed with
bipolar affective disorder.] Son born
with cleft lip [and] palate - [third]
surgery next month - travel to [Utah] for those[.] [Five] days ago - mood swings
worse. Out of work (took days off work as [manager] of Texas Roadhouse).
Depressed. Poor sleep - [three to four] hourslnight, tired in day. Tired.
Lethargic. Yet also manic. Thoughts are racing fast - on multiple levels - at
some time thinks sporadically - 'we're in debt - let's buy another vehicle - we
have a [ten] month old in [the] house.' High energy too - cleaned house from top
to bottom [until] 2am last night. He notes manic episodes have occurred for hours
to [one to two] weeks, marked by irritable mood, mildly euphoric, high energy,
pressure to stay busy, racing thoughts, rapid speech, more social, poor impulse
control (recently drove [six] hours, spent money on a friend, now can't afford rent
bill). Manic episodes began about 5/02." (Def. Ex. 13, pp. 236-37) (emphasis
added).
Notes also show that Claimant denied abuse or dependence on alcohol or
street drugs. Dr. Jensen diagnosed him with rapid cycling bipolar affective
disorder, cycling one to five times per day. (Def. Ex. 13, pp. 238-39).
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-

4/26/2004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Dr. Caitlin Ahem records: "Patient is a 27
year old male with [history of! Bipolar saw Dr. Jensen today added Depokote
500mg QAM, he is not sleeping even with the Zyprexa and has been having
[headaches], he has old Ambien at home which has helped a little." Claimant
received a prescription for Ambien. (Def. Ex. 12, p. 229).

-

7/2112004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Dr. Caitlin Ahem records: "Patient is a 27

year old male. HEADACHE - worse at night. DEPRESSION improved on
medicine. MOOD Swings improved on medicine. SLEEP Disturbance. STRESS
at work." Dr. Ahern diagnosed Claimant with manic depression. (Def. Ex.
12, p. 234) (emphasis added).
-

9/8/2004 (Cheyenne, WY, age 28) - Emergency room records note Claimant
passed out at home and was unconscious for several minutes. (Def. Ex. 14, p.
255).

-

10128/2004 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 28) - Records from Dr. Tony Roisum state

Claimant presented with severe headaches and nausea, and his medications
were not helping. He had a constant headache for the past week. Claimant
was prescribed Stadol and Phenergan, and instructed to continue using Midrin and
Vicodin. (Def. Ex. 16, p. 266) (emphasis added).
-

4/6/2005 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 28) - Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center

emergency room report: "The patient has a long history of headaches, but has
increasing difficulty in recent weeks .... A week ago, he had some fairly classic
visual scotomata .... The patient did suffer a head injury in 1998, had a CT scan
at the time .... He has also been prescribed Hydrocodone by an outpatient clinic
today but that has not been particularly useful." (Def. Ex. 6, p. 110) (emphasis
added).
-

4/8/2005 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 28) - Records from Dr. Tony Roisum: "Patient
presents with a headache, nausea, vomiting, fatigue and also difficulties with
headache and generally, the patient is just not feeling well and he thinks it is
because he has been off of the Zyprexa and he thinks maybe some of the
stresses are getting to him." Diagnosed with fatigue, insomnia, headache,
nausealvomiting, and visual changes. (Def. Ex. 16, p. 269) (emphasis added).

-

11110/2005 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 29) - Three days before Claimant's industrial
accident. Psychiatric evaluation with Darin Leslie, PA-C. Notes state: "29-year
old male who complains of manic symptoms including sleep deprivation,
difficulty concentration, feeling overwhelmed with life and current situation.
Describes significant psychological stressors including 2-year old son who is
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currently hospitalized with unknown illness. Son also has a cleft lip and palate,
has gone through [nine] surgeries so far. Also describes a very high stress job as
a restaurant manager, working 70 hours/week with one day off. In the last two
weeks has . . . very little to no sleep whatsoever. Having difficulty thinking,
seeing things out of the corners of his eyes that aren't there. Went to
Emergency Department three days ago, was given Ambien for sleep, which was
not helpful. Has had recurrent suicidal ideation, but not plans and not
intention. Describes similar episode approximately [five] years ago following
stillbirth of first child. Was hospitalized for [four] days. Continued on
medication for [two] years. Describes recent symptoms as worse than first
episode. Also notes that he has lost 18lbs in last [three] weeks." Current
medications were noted as Lithium, Clonazepam, and Zoloft. Mr. Leslie
prescribed Zyprexa and increased the dosage of Lithium. (Def. Ex. 17, pp. 27576) (emphasis added).
At the time of hearing in December 2010, Claimant was 34 years of age and
residing in Idaho Falls. (R., p. 4).

III. Standard of Review
Findings of fact made by the Idaho Industrial Commission are subject to limited appellate
review. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9; I.C. § 72-732. The reviewing court's function is to determine
whether the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Const. Art. V,
§ 9; I.C. § 72-732(1).

Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a

reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts,

Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) (quoting Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho
State Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996)). It is more than a scintilla of
proof, but less than a preponderance. Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d
211,217 (2000). All facts and inferences will be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
who prevailed before the Industrial Commission, and the Commission's conclusions regarding
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credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly
erroneous. Neihart, 141 Idaho at 802-03, 118 P.3d at 134-35.

IV. Issues Presented on Appeal
A. Is the Commission's finding that Claimant's November 13,2005, industrial injury does not
include a psychological condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-451 supported by substantial
and competent evidence?
B. Did the Commission err by quoting the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IV-TR®
and considering Claimant's prescription history?
C. Is Claimant entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804?
D. Are Employer and Surety entitled attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2?

V. Argument
A. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT CLAIMANT'S NOVEMBER 13, 2005,
INDUSTRIAL INJURY DOES NOT INCLUDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONDITION PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 72-451 IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE CLAIMANT IS
NOT A RELIABLE HISTORIAN WITH RESPECT TO HIS MEDICAL
HISTORY AND THE OPINION OF DR. ENRIGHT IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN
THE OPINIONS OF DRS. MURDOCK AND OSTROM.
There are different legal standards in Idaho for physical and psychological injuries. For
physical injuries, a worker must establish a probable, not merely possible, connection to the
cause and effect to prove compensability. Vernon v. Omark Indus., 113 Idaho 358, 360, 744
P.2d 86, 88 (1987). In contrast, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-451, psychological injuries are
compensable only when the following conditions are met:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

The injury was caused by an accident and physical injury or occupational
disease or psychological mishap accompanied by resultant physical injury;
The injury did not arise from conditions generally inherent in every working
situation or from a personnel related action;
Such accident and injury must be the predominant cause as compared to
all other causes combined of any consequence;
The causes or injuries must exist in a real and objective sense;
The condition must be one which constitutes a diagnosis under the American
Psychiatric Association's most recent diagnostic and statistics manual,
and must be diagnosed by a psychologist or psychiatrist licensed in the
jurisdiction in which treatment is rendered;
There is clear and convincing evidence that the injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment from the accident or occupational disease.

I.C. § 72-451 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, rigorous causation standards apply when a worker alleges a psychological
injury.

Smith v. Garland Construction Servs., 2009 lIC 0179 (June 8, 2009).

"Clear and

convincing" means a degree of proof greater than a mere preponderance. In the Matter of

Gordon W Jenkins, 120 Idaho 379, 383, 816 P.2d 335, 339 (1991). It is generally understood to
be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re

Doe, 244 P.3d 190, 193,2010 Ida. LEXTS 198,6-7 (2010); In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141
P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006).

Essentially, when there is conflicting evidence throughout the

proceedings, the standard cannot be met because clear and convincing evidence is evidence that
is free from confusion, fully intelligible, distinct, and which establishes that the truth of the
asserted fact is highly probable. Shields v. Villareal, 33 P.3d 1032, 1036 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
The Industrial Commission has stated that Idaho Code § 72-451(3) doest not present a
"but for" standard of causation. Smith, 2009 lIC 0179. It explained:
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Under the predominant cause standard, it is not sufficient that the
industrial injury be merely the proverbial "straw that breaks the
camel's back." Although an employer takes an employee as he is,
in determining the predominant cause of a psychological condition,
the contribution of all of the employee's pre-accident factors must
be weighed against the contribution of the industrial accident. To
be the predominant cause, the work injury must be a greater cause
of the psychological condition than all other causes combined.
Thus, if a percentage of contribution were assigned to each and
every factor which collectively produce a claimant's psychological
condition, the contribution of the industrial accident must be more
than 50% of the total of all of the causes. Against this standard, the
evidence, including expert testimony, produced by the parties must
be evaluated.

I
I
Id.

In our case, Claimant asserts he provided compelling, competent, and substantial proof
regarding each element of Idaho Code § 72-451, but the standard is clear and convincing
evidence, and the Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the worker
when evidence is conflicting. Bennett v. Bunker Hill Co., 88 Idaho 300, 305, 399 P.2d 270, 272
(1965). The evidence regarding Claimant's pre-accident psychological treatment is significant,
including treatment and medication for bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression. Nonetheless,
following his industrial injury, Claimant repeatedly told medical providers his only prior
psychological treatment was for an acute incident of depression following the stillbirth of his
daughter. Medical records show that following his bum injury, he consistently exaggerated the
nature of his injury and minimized the extent of his prior psychological conditions. Accordingly,
the Commission concluded Claimant is not a reliable historian with respect to his medical
history, and where his testimony differed from the information contained in his medical records,
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it gave the infonnation in the medical records more weight. Affording certain evidence more
weight is well within the Commission's discretion and its findings are supported by the evidence.
Claimant also asserts the opinions of Drs. Murdock and Ostrom support his position.
However, as stated above, the weight to be given to testimony, the credibility of the witnesses,
and the reasonable conclusions and inferences to be derived from the record are peculiarly within
the province of the Industrial Commission. !d. On appeal, Claimant is simply asking the court
to reweigh the testimony and credibility of his witnesses.

The Commission determined his

experts failed to render adequate evidence to support his prima facie case of proving a
psychological injury under Idaho Code § 72-451. Specifically, the Commission found that Drs.
Murdock and Ostrom lacked foundation because neither reviewed medical records related to his
bum injury or pre-injury psychological treatment.

Their opinions regarding any change in

Claimant's psychological condition following his industrial accident were thus deemed to lack
credibility. The Commission also found the doctors' testimony failed to establish a DSM-IVTR® diagnosis of PTSD. Dr. Murdock failed to confirm symptoms sufficient to establish a
diagnosis, and failed to rule out malingering or other psychological conditions, such as bipolar
disorder.

Moreover, there is no evidence Dr. Ostrom confinned the DSM criteria for

establishing PTSD in reaching her diagnosis.
In contrast, Dr. Enright reviewed Claimant's prior medical records and records from his
bum injury, which gave him independent knowledge of Claimant's prior psychological
treatment.

He documented specific examples of Claimant's conflicting statements upon

evaluation and to medical providers. Additionally, Dr. Enright is the only expert who tested
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Claimant to determine whether he qualified for a clinical diagnosis of PTSD.

Dr. Enright

concluded Claimant did not meet the criteria for PTSD, and that his November 13, 2005,
industrial accident and injury are not the predominant factor above all other factors combined of
his current psychological condition.
The Commission's decision demonstrates it considered the entire record and found
Claimant's experts less credible than Employer's/Surety's and thus gave their testimony less
weight. Dr. Enright's testimony is competent evidence to support the Commission's finding that
Claimant's industrial injury did not include a psychological injury pursuant to Idaho Code § 72451.
B. THE COMMISSION'S REFERENCE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION'S DSM-IV-TR® WAS REASONABLE AND IN ACCORDANCE
WITH IDAHO CODE § 72-451(5), AND ITS DISCUSSION OF CLAIMANT'S
PRESCRIPTION HISTORY WAS WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY AS THE FINDER
OF FACT.

Claimant asserts the Commission erred when it quoted specific sections of the DSM-IVTR® regarding PTSD because the entire manual was not admitted into evidence. As set forth
above, Idaho Code § 72-451 expressly provides that the alleged psychological condition must be
one which constitutes a diagnosis under the American Psychiatric Association's most recent
diagnostic and statistics manual, and must be diagnosed by a psychologist or psychiatrist
licensed in the jurisdiction in which treatment is rendered.

I.e. § 72-451(5).

The plain language

of the statute indicates that the legislature intended the Commission, as the fact-finder, to
consider DSM criteria in any decision involving a psychological injury. Moreover, Idaho Code §
72-714(3) provides:
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I
the commission, or member thereot: or a hearing officer, referee or
examiner, to whom the matter has been assigned, shall make such
inquiries and investigations as may be deemed necessary.
I.C. § 72-714(3) (emphasis added).
In addition, the Industrial Commission is not governed by the same rules of evidence as

e

I

courts of law. Strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required in Industrial Commission
proceedings, and admission of evidence in such proceedings is more relaxed. Hagler v. Micron
Technology, 118 Idaho 596, 598-99, 798 P.2d 55, 57-58 (1990). When the legislature created the

Commission, it intended that proceedings be as summary, economical, and simple as the rules of
equity would allow. I.C. § 72-708; See Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263, 441
P.2d 172, 173 (1968); Hite v. Kulhenak Bldg. Contractor, 96 Idaho 70, 72, 524 P.2d 531, 533
(1974). Recognized treatises and works dealing with topics in which the Commission possesses
expertise may be admitted into evidence through witnesses to be used as substantive evidence.
Hite, 96 Idaho at 72, 524 P.2d at 533. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5251(5), which controls the

admission of evidence in proceedings governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, the
Commission may utilize its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the
evaluation of evidence. See Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44,49-50, 156 P.3d 545, 550-51 (2007).
Claimant does not dispute that the DSM-IV -TR® is the American Psychiatric
Association's most recent diagnostic and statistics manual. Although neither party offered the
entire manual into evidence, Dr. Enright testified that it was a recognized authority regarding
psychological conditions and discussed the primary criteria for establishing a diagnosis of PTSD.
Claimant did not object to Dr. Enright's reference or reliance on the manual at the time of his
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testimony, nor did he object to it in his post-hearing brief. Claimant does not allege he suffers
from conditions other than PTSD as a result of his industrial injury, and provides no evidence for
why the entire manual, which discusses many other psychological conditions, should be admitted
into evidence. Further, because Idaho Code § 72-451 requires that a psychological condition be
one which constitutes a diagnosis under the American Psychiatric Association's most recent
diagnostic and statistics manual, it reasonably follows that the Commission may rely on the
manual and examine any sections it deems relevant to determining whether a claimant's alleged
psychological condition is compensable.

Accordingly, the Commission's reliance on the

American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IV-TR® was reasonable and in accordance with Idaho
Code § 72-451(5).
Claimant similarly contends the Commission ened by considering evidence in the record
(Claimant's prescription history), and giving "it's[sic] own qualified medical opinion" of
Claimant's pre-injury medical diagnosis. (Cl. Brief, p. 20). First, this assertion misconstrues the
Commission's findings.

The Commission did not diagnose Claimant's pre-injury medical

condition; it described the medications Claimant was prescribed and the reasons they are
commonly prescribed.

Further, not only can such information be gleaned from Claimant's

medical and prescription records in evidence, which document his symptoms and medication
history, but Dr. Enright explained in his testimony the specific types of medications that are
prescribed for bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and sleep disturbances. The Commission's
consideration of Claimant's prescription medication history and its statements about certain
medications is within its discretion as the finder of fact and not in enor. Alternatively, even if
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the Commission's statements about Claimant's prescriptions were erroneous, the error was
harmless. See Hagler, 118 Idaho at 599, 798 P.2d at 58.
Claimant further alleges the Commission utilized the Internet to find a reference in the
DSM-IV-TR®, but such allegation again misconstrues the Commission's finding and is without
merit.

The Commission stated the DSM-IV -TR® criteria are "readily available through the

Internet and other sources" to indicate its availability to Claimant or any of his providers. (R., p.
30). There is no evidence the Commission relied on the Internet in reaching its decision and
Claimant cites no legal supp011 for his contention the reference was erroneous.
Claimant also disagrees with a number of the Commission's findings of fact for a variety
of reasons.

Employer/Surety dispute Claimant's characterizations of why the findings are

inaccurate and contend such findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence and
not in error.

C. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL BECAUSE
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
COMMISSION'S DECISION HE DID NOT SUSTAIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL
INJURY.
Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a matter of right under Idaho's Worker's
Compensation Law, but may only be affirmatively awarded under the circumstances set forth in
Idaho Code § 72-804. Wutherich v. Terteling Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 593, 595, 21 P.3d 915, 917

(2001); Troutner v. Traffic Control Co., 97 Idaho 525, 528, 547 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976). Idaho
Code § 72-804 provides:
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Attorney's fees -- Punitive costs in certain cases. If the
commission or any court before whom any proceedings are
brought under this law determines that the employer or his surety
contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee
or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground,
or that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to
pay to the injured employee or his dependents the compensation
provided by law, or without reasonable grounds discontinued
payment of compensation as provided by law justly due and owing
to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay
reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided
by this law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by
injured employees or their dependents shall be fixed by the
commlSSlOn.
I.C. § 72-804.

In this case, following its investigation, Employer/Surety denied Claimant's claim he
sustained a psychological injury based on his medical records showing extensive psychological
treatment prior to the accident and the opinion of Dr. Enright. The Commission agreed, and
determined Claimant did not qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-IV -TR®, that his
November 13, 2005, industrial bum injury was not the predominant cause of his current
psychological condition, and that he did not suffer a psychological injury arising out of and in
the course of his employment with Employer. Given the abundance of evidence demonstrating
Claimant's extensive pre-injury psychological treatment and Dr. Enright's findings, denial of his
claim was reasonable and attorney fees are not warranted.
D. EMPLOYER AND SURETY ARE ENTITLED ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT
TO IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 11.2 BECAUSE CLAIMANT'S APPEAL IS NOT
WELL GROUNDED IN FACT AND MERELY ASKS THE COURT TO REWEIGH THE EVIDENCE.
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Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 provides that an attorney's signature on a notice of appeal
constitutes
a certificate that the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal .
. .; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
l.A.R. 11.2.

The court has held that "[a]lthough an attorney's purpose in tiling an appeal may not
always appear clear from the record, this Court can infer intent and purpose from the attorney's
actions and the surrounding circumstances." Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Constr., Inc., 144 Idaho
171, 176, 158 P.3d 947, 952 (2007) (quoting Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, Inc., 141
Idaho 801, 803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005». In Fritts, the appellants failed to provide the court
with the necessary record, which led the court to conclude they had failed to demonstrate a basis
for bringing the appeal and wasted judicial resources. Fritts, 144 Idaho at 176-77, 158 P.3d at
952-53. As a sanction, the court awarded attorney fees to the respondents. Id.
In this case, Claimant's appeal is not well grounded in fact because the facts
overwhelmingly support the Commission's decision. Moreover, Claimant is simply asking the
court to re-weigh the evidence and evaluate the Commission's credibility determinations, which
is an improper basis for an appeal. Claimant provides no existing law or good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and has needlessly increased the cost of
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litigation. For these reasons, an improper purpose can be inferred and attorney fees and costs are
appropriate.

VI. Conclusion

Because the Commission's decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence
and Claimant's appeal simply asks the court to re-weigh the facts and evaluate the Commission's
credibility determinations, Employer/Surety respectively request the court uphold the
Commission's decision and award attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 20th day of April, 2012.

Emma R. Wilson
Attorney for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, ID 83702
Stephen A. Meikle
Advantage Legal Services
P.O. Box 51137
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

EMMA R. WILSON
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